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Land Use and the First Amendment
Alan Weinstein
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M.C.P., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1979;
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B.A., University of Pennsylvania, 1967.
THE PAST YEAR SAW NO CESSATION in cases reporting on the conflicts
that arise when local land-use regulation is applied to uses claiming
protection under the First Amendment. This report highlights the major
developments in this area.
I. Regulation of Religious Institutions
A. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)1
Since RFRA's enactment in 1993,2 both courts3 and scholars4 have
questioned the Act's constitutionality. This question will now be de-
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000b to 2000b-4.
2. The genesis of the Act lay in congressional dissatisfaction with a 1990 decision
of the U.S. Supreme Court which had dramatically altered the treatment of claims to
religious freedom under the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause. In Employment
Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the Court held that "the right of free exercise
does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral
law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct
that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).' " Id. at 879, quoting United States v.
Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263, n.3 (1982) (Stevens concurring).
Three years after Smith, however, in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City
of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993), the Court unanimously agreed on the general
principle that laws which are nonneutral, because their object is to infringe upon or
restrict practices based on their religious motivation, may only be upheld if justified
by a compelling governmental interest and the law is narrowly tailored to advance
that interest. The Hialeah case thus sent a strong signal to the lower courts that the
Smith decision should not be read to permit the targeting of religious practices under
the guise of a purportedly general and religiously neutral ordinance.
3. Compare Keeler v. Cumberland, 928 F. Supp. 591 (D. Md. 1996) (Keeler
1) (holding RFRA unconstitutional as violation of separation of powers), and Flores
v. City of Boerne, 877 F. Supp. 355 (W.D. Tex. 1995) (holding Act unconstitutional
on grounds Congress did not act pursuant to an enumerated power), with Flores v.
City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'g, 877 F. Supp. 355 (holding Act
constitutional pursuant to congressional enforcement power under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
4. See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Letting
the Fox into the Henhouse Under Cover of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
16 CARoOZO L. REv. 357 (1994); Scott C. Idleman, The Religious Freedom Restoration
Act: Pushing the Limits of Legislative Power, 73 TEX. L. REV. 247 (1994).
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cided in Flores v. City of Boerne,5 a case argued before the U.S. Su-
preme Court this past Term. In Boerne, the Catholic bishop of San
Antonio, Texas, claimed that the City of Boerne had violated RFRA
when it denied a building permit for a proposed addition to St. Peter
Church because the church was located partially in an historic district.
At trial, the federal district court, citing Marbury v. Madison,6 found
RFRA unconstitutional because the statute usurped the power of the
judiciary "to say what the law is" 7 and also held that Congress lacked
the power to enact RFRA under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
(the Enforcement Clause) and that RFRA violated the Tenth Amend-
ment because it limits the states' powers to legislate in areas traditionally
under state sovereignty.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,8 holding that RFRA
does not violate the separation of powers and that the enforcement
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment empowers Congress to legislate
acts such as RFRA to scrutinize statutes that burden an individual's
free exercise of religion. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari
in October 1996 and the case was argued on February 19, 1997.
At oral argument, the members of the Court closely questioned coun-
sel for the City of Boerne and the church on four separate areas involving
the constitutionality of RFRA: (1) the authority of Congress to enact
the statute under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) whether
RFRA violates the separation of powers by returning the task of accom-
modating general laws and religious practices to the courts after Smith
denied that power; (3) whether RFRA violates the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment; and (4) whether RFRA violates the
5. 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1996).
6. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
7. 877 F. Supp. 355 (W.D. Tex. 1995). Specifically, the district court reasoned
that in enacting RFRA Congress impermissibly sought to overturn the Supreme Court's
decision in Employment Division, Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872 (1990), by imposing stricter standards of scrutiny for legislation affecting First
Amendment rights than were set forth in Smith, where the Court held that the First
Amendment's Free Exercise Clause does not prohibit application of a facially neutral,
generally applicable law to religious practice. Congress had clearly articulated its
disagreement with Smith in the statutory language of RFRA, which states that Smith
"virtually eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on religious
exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a). In contrast
to Smith, RFRA mandates that the government shall not substantially burden a person's
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability
"unless (1) it is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the
least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb(a) & (b).
8. Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct.
293 (1996).
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Tenth Amendment by limiting state control in areas of traditional sover-
eignty.
Lower court decisions in land-use cases involving RFRA have
yielded mixed results, a point that may well become moot depending
on the Court's decision on RFRA's constitutionality. For example,
while in Jesus Center v. Farmington Hills Zoning Bd. Of Appeals9 and
Western Presbyterian Church v. District of Columbia, " the courts found
that RFRA barred enforcement of zoning restrictions on religious insti-
tutions, in Daytona Rescue Mission, Inc. v. City of Daytona Beach,"
a Florida federal district court rejected a claim that the Act barred the
application of locational restrictions to a homeless shelter and food
bank proposed to be housed in a church. 12 In other cases decided under
the Act, courts: (1) denied a claim that the Act bars the application
of parking requirements to religious institutions 13; (2) held that the
Act does not apply to uses that constitute a nuisance, in this instance
a massive display of Christmas lights that created traffic jams and other
problems in a residential neighborhood14; and (3) denied a preliminary
injunction to plaintiffs claiming that the Act bars the need for a special
permit for a Wiccan Church in a residential district. 5
B. Zoning Cases Involving Religious Institutions
Although state courts have traditionally applied a substantive due pro-
cess analysis in cases dealing with zoning control over religious institu-
tions,16 in the past decade there has been a movement in some state
courts toward applying an analysis based on the First Amendment.
9. 544 N.W.2d 698 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).
10. 849 F. Supp. 77 (D.D.C. 1994).
11. 1995 WL 289632 (M.D. Fla.).
12. The court found that "the City's interest in regulating homeless shelters and
food banks is a compelling interest and that [the zoning] code furthers that interest in
the least restrictive means," thus upholding the city under the First Amendment analysis
that predated Smith. Id. at 6. See also First Assembly of God of Naples, Florida, Inc.
v. Collier County, 20 F.3d 419 (11th Cir.), opinion modified on denial of reh'g, 27
F.3d 526 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 730 (1995). Here, the Eleventh
Circuit, without reference to the Act, held that the closing of a church-operated homeless
shelter due to violations of various zoning laws did not violate the First Amendment.
Subsequently, the Eleventh Circuit modified its opinion, stating that "the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 may apply to this case. However, since it was not
raised by either party, we decline to discuss it." 27 F.3d at 526.
13. Germantown Seventh Day Adventist Church v. Philadelphia, 1994 WL470191
(E.D. Pa.).
14. Osborne v. Power, 890 S.W.2d 570 (Ark. 1994) (citing dictum in Western
Presbyterian).
15. Church of Iron Oak v. Palm Bay, 868 F. Supp. 1361 (M.D. Fla. 1994). The
court also declined to enter injunction due to doctrine of abstention.
16. See, e.g., LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION 131-32 (Brian W. Blaesser &
Alan C. Weinstein, eds. 1989).
Recent cases that illustrate this trend include: Grace Community
Church v. Town of Bethel, 17 Macedonian Orthodox Church v. Planning
Board of the Township of Randolph,18 and Kali Bari Temple v. Bd. of
Adjustment. "
C. Historic Preservation of Houses of Worship
The majority of courts that have ruled on First Amendment challenges
to the application of historic preservation ordinances to religious institu-
tions have found the ordinances to be unconstitutional.2° In the most
recent cases, both state and federal courts again found that the applica-
tion of landmark laws to houses of worship was unconstitutional.
In First United Methodist Church v. Hearing Examiner,21 the Wash-
ington State Supreme Court held that the mere nomination of a church
as a landmark violates the First Amendment due to the constraints
imposed on the church by the interim controls that apply as a result
of nomination. In two federal district court cases involving the denial of
a permit to demolish a monastery, the court, after rejecting a challenge
brought under RFRA on the ground that the Act was an unconstitutional
as violation of separation of powers ,22 applied a "compelling govern-
mental interest" test to find that the permit denial violated the federal
and state constitutions based on its finding that the local landmark law
was "not a neutral law of general applicability" under Smith due to
its variance and hardship provisions.23
Another aspect of the conflict between churches and landmark com-
missions has been attempts to create religious exemptions or owner
consent provisions in local preservation ordinances for landmark desig-
17. 30 Conn. App. 765, 622 A.2d 591 (1993).
18. 269 N.J. Super. 562, 636 A.2d 96 (1994) (finding no First Amendment viola-
tion).
19. 271 N.J. Super. 241, 638 A.2d 839 (1994) (ruling that denial of variance to
permit occasional religious worship of small numbers of persons in private home was
unjustified).
20. In Society of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks Commission, 409 Mass. 38, 564
N.E.2d 571 (1990), and First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 114 Wash. 2d
392, 787 P.2d 1352 (1990), vacated and remanded, 111 S. Ct. 1097 (1991), holding
reinstated, 120 Wash. 2d 203, 840 P. 2d 174 (1992), the Massachusetts and Washington
courts found that the designation of a church as a landmark violated the state and/or
federal constitution, while in St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914
F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1103 (1991), the Second Circuit
held that the Free Exercise Clause did not require the New York City Landmarks
Commission to permit a church to demolish a landmarked auxiliary building in order
to erect an office tower in its place.
21. 129 Wash.2d 238, 916 P.2d 374 (1996).
22. Keeler v. Cumberland, 928 F. Supp. 591 (D. Md. 1996) (Keeler 1).
23. Keeler v. Cumberland, 940 F. Supp. 879 (D. Md. 1996) (Keeler 11).
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nation of religious properties24 or to enact state legislation imposing
similar restrictions. Although the most recent attempt to enact such
state legislation-an amendment to California's enabling legislation for
local historic preservation ordinances which created an exemption for
property owned by religious institutions-was successful, the statute
was struck down as violative of the Establishment Clauses of the U.S.
and California Constitutions by a trial court in East Bay Asian Local
Dev. Corp. v. State of California.25
II. Regulation of Signs and Billboards
A. Regulation of Real Estate Signs
In Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro 26 the U.S. Su-
preme Court held that a local government may not prohibit the use of
temporary real estate signs in residential areas because such a prohibi-
tion unduly restricts the flow of information. Although courts have
upheld the imposition of reasonable restrictions on the size, number,
and location of real estate signs in furtherance of legitimate interests
such as aesthetics,27 such restrictions are always suspect because they
are content-based. In the most recent case involving this issue, Cleve-
land Area Bd. of Realtors v. City of Euclid,28 an organization of real
estate brokers challenged a city ordinance restricting real estate signs
to placement in windows, as opposed to the more normal placement
of such signs in the yard of a property offered for sale. Although the
federal district had found that the ostensibly content-neutral regulation
was, in reality, aimed at the message of "white flight" conveyed by
realty signs,29 the Sixth Circuit viewed the ordinance as a content-
neutral regulation, despite the alleged motives of the members of the
city council, but still struck it down based on the findings that the
ordinance was neither narrowly tailored to achieve its claimed interest
in aesthetics nor did it provide an adequate alternative channel of com-
munication.
24. Some local ordinances provide more limited protection for churches, such as
exemption from interior designation or hardship provision for tax-exempt properties.
25. No. 95AS02560 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 15,1996).
26. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
27. See, e.g., South-Suburban Housing Center v. Greater South Suburban Bd. of
Realtors, 935 F.2d 868 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Greater South Suburban
Bd. of Realtors v. Blue Island, 112 S. Ct. 971 (1992) (upholding restrictions on the
size, placement, and number of realty signs to protect the aesthetic interests of a wooded
semi-rural village).
28. 88 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 1996).
29. CABOR v. City of Euclid, 833 F. Supp. 1253 (N.D. Ohio 1993).
B. Regulation of Alcohol and Cigarette Advertising
In 1995, the Fourth Circuit, relying on the Central Hudson test for
commercial speech,30 affirmed the district courts' rulings in two cases
that upheld Baltimore ordinances enacted to restrict outdoor advertising
of cigarettes and alcoholic beverages. In Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Mayor
and City Council of Baltimore,3' the brewer and an outdoor advertising
company challenged the ordinance banning billboard advertising of
alcoholic beverages, 32 while Penn Advertising v. Mayor and City Coun-
cil of Baltimore,33 involved the advertising company's challenge to
the ordinance prohibiting cigarette advertising on billboards located in
certain designated zones. In both cases, the Fourth Circuit emphasized
that the city had acted reasonably in restricting the locations where
alcohol and tobacco could be advertised on billboards because the regu-
lations materially advanced the city's interest in promoting the welfare
of minors by seeking to reduce alcohol and tobacco consumption by
minors.
Both of these cases were subsequently vacated by the U.S. Supreme
Court, however, and remanded 34 for further consideration in light of
the Court's ruling in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,35 in which
the Court struck down a state statute that virtually banned price advertis-
ing for alcoholic beverages as a violation of the First Amendment.3 6
While a decision on remand is still pending in Penn Advertising, the
Fourth Circuit has again affirmed the district court in Anheuser-Busch,
holding that the ordinance banning billboards advertising alcoholic bev-
30. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980) sets forth a four-part test for restrictions on commercial speech: (1) Is the
speech lawful and not misleading? If so, it is protected by the First Amendment, and
the court must ask: (2) whether the asserted government interest is substantial. If it
is, the court must determine (3) whether the regulation directly advances the govern-
mental interest asserted and (4) whether it is not more extensive than necessary to
serve that interest.
31. 63 F.3d 1305 (4th Cir. 1995), aff'g, 855 F. Supp. 811 (D. Md. 1994).
32. In 1993, the Maryland legislature had enacted a statute that delegated authority
to the City of Baltimore to adopt an ordinance restricting outdoor advertising of alcoholic
beverages if the city determined the ordinance is "necessary for the promotion of the
welfare and temperance of minors." Id. at 812-13.
33. 63 F.3d 1318 (4th Cir. 1995), aff'g, 862 F. Supp. 1402 (D. Md. 1994).
34. Penn Advertising of Baltimore, Inc. v. Schmoke, 116 S. Ct. 2575 (1996),
vacating and remanding, 63 F.3d 1318, and Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke, 116
S. Ct. 1821 (1996), vacating and remanding, 63 F.3d 1305.
35. 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996).
36. Although the Court was unanimous in striking down the statute, the Justices
split on the rationale for their ruling. For a discussion of the differences between the
principal opinion, written by Justice Stevens, and the concurring opinion of Justice
O'Connor. See Edward 0. Correia, State and Local Regulation of Cigarette Advertis-
ing, 23 J. LEGISLATION 1, 9-11 (1997).
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erages in areas where they are likely to be viewed by minors is a valid
time, place, and manner regulation.37
III. Adult Business Regulations38
A. Zoning Restrictions on Location
The U.S. Supreme Court has established that municipalities may single
out adult businesses for special regulatory treatment in the form of
locational restrictions if the municipality can show a substantial public
interest in regulating such businesses unrelated to the suppression of
speech and if the regulations allow for a reasonable number of alterna-
tive locations.39 An ordinance will be struck down, however, when
cities attempt to regulate because they object to the sexually explicit
messages conveyed by adult businesses or seek to exclude, or severely
restrict, adult businesses through an outright ban or excessive locational
requirements. 4°
After struggling to develop a standard for judging the reasonableness
of locational restrictions, courts have recently focused on whether there
are an adequate number of potential sites for adult businesses within
the relevant local real estate market.41 As currently defined, this stan-
dard allows consideration of economic factors to define the relevant
37. 101 F.3d 325 (1997).
38. The terms "adult business" or "adult entertainment business" typically refers
to bookstores, theaters, mini-theaters, video rental stores, bars, and cabarets that purvey
"adult entertainment" consisting of performances or merchandise characterized by
an emphasis on nudity and sexual acts. See generally J. GERARD, LOCAL REGULATION
OF ADULT BUSINESSES (1992), and F. STROM, ZONING CONTROL OF SEX BUSINESSES
(1977).
39. Young v. American Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976), and City of Renton
v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
40. See, e.g. Woodall v. City of El Paso, 959 F.2d 1305, modifying 950 F.2d
255 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 304 (1992) (requiring all 39 adult businesses
in city to relocate). See also Alexander v. City of Minneapolis, 928 F.2d 278 (8th
Cir. 1991) (requiring at least 30 of 36 adult businesses to relocate to 0.54 percent of
the total land area of the city).
41. The "real estate market" standard appeared initially in the Fifth Circuit's
1992 decision in Woodall, 959 F.2d at 1305, where, after recognizing that Renton
"contemplated that there was a 'market' in which [adult] businesses could purchase
or lease real property on which business could be conducted," the court ruled that "land
with physical characteristics that render it unavailable for any kind of development, or
legal characteristics that exclude adult businesses, may not be considered 'available'
for constitutional purposes under Renton," but declined to address "the relationship
between the economics of site location and the constitutionality of an adult business
zoning ordinance." Id. at 1306. In a later ruling in this same case, the Fifth Circuit
applied this standard to reverse and remand a district court decision on the ground
that the jury had improperly taken commercial reasonableness into account when it
determined that the adult business provisions of the zoning ordinance left insufficient
locations for adult businesses.
real estate market but bars consideration of "commercial viability"
for particular sites that are found to be within the relevant market.
This approach, which allows courts to judge whether sites for adult
businesses are "reasonably available," affords local government ample
opportunity to impose significant locational restrictions on adult busi-
nesses to avoid undesirable secondary effects, but prevents local gov-
ernment from effectively banning such businesses by limiting them to
locations that present insuperable physical, legal, or economic barriers
to development or operation.
In North Avenue Novelties, Inc. v. City of Chicago,42 for example,
the court upheld an ordinance allowing adult uses on less than I percent
of land, where the evidence showed twenty-two to fifty-six sites were
available, the city received only four to five inquiries per year regarding
new adult uses, and no person had been prevented by the ordinance
from attempting to open an adult use.
In addition to overly severe locational restrictions, an adult entertain-
In Topanga Press, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 989 F.2d 1524 (9th Cir. 1993),
the Ninth Circuit squarely faced the economics question that Woodall had avoided.
Recognizing that the distinction between economic and other factors is difficult to
maintain because physical and legal unavailability can be presented as economic un-
availability-e.g., a site located five miles from the nearest public road could be seen
either as physically unavailable or, given the cost of constructing an access route, as
economically unavailable-the Ninth Circuit argued that the economics of site location
is a valid inquiry, so long as the economic analysis focuses on whether a site is part
of the relevant real estate market. Id. at 1530. The court stated:
Accordingly, we do not think that Renton forbids a court to consider economics
when evaluating whether a particular site is in fact part of the real estate market.
For purposes of Renton, the distinction is between consideration of economic impact
within an actual business real estate market and consideration of cost to determine
whether a specific relocation site is part of the relevant market. A court may not
consider the former, but it may consider the latter when determining whether a
specific site is reasonably suitable for the operation of a business.
After reviewing several decisions involving locational restrictions, the Ninth Circuit
noted the conditions that need to apply for a particular site to be considered part of
the relevant real estate market. First, although Renton stressed that properties only
had to be "potentially" available, the court argued that "a property is not 'potentially'
available when it is unreasonable to believe that it would ever become available to
any commercial enterprise." Second, sites in manufacturing or industrial zones are
part of the market if they are: reasonably accessible to the general public; have a
proper infrastructure of sidewalks, roads and lighting; and are generally suitable for
some form of commercial enterprise. Third, and most obviously, commercially zoned
locations are part of the real estate market. Once a site qualifies as part of the real
estate market under these criteria, however, its "commercial viability" as an adult
business location is irrelevant. Applying these criteria to the relocation sites offered
under the challenged Los Angeles ordinance, the court concluded that much of the
land "potentially available" for the relocation of adult businesses was not part of the
real estate market and struck down the ordinance because it did not provide sufficient
"reasonably available" sites for the relocation of adult businesses.
42. 88 F.3d 441 (7th Cir. 1996).
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ment ordinance can also be struck down when the local government
cannot show that the ordinance was enacted for the purpose of ad-
dressing negative secondary effects. In Secret Desires Lingerie, Inc.
v. City of Atlanta,43 for example, the Georgia Supreme Court held
that an "adult entertainment" ordinance regulating lingerie modeling
studios enacted without any consideration of the potential negative sec-
ondary effects of such businesses was unconstitutional." Similarly, in
T & D Video, Inc. v. City of Revere,45 the Massachusetts court struck
down an ordinance, in part, because there was no evidence "negative
secondary effects" were considered before enactment and the court
held that justifications offered during litigation are insufficient to show
that the ordinance was enacted to serve a substantial governmental
interest.
B. Licensing/Special Permit Ordinances
In FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas,46 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that
the licensing provisions of a comprehensive adult business ordinance
constituted a prior restraint on freedom of expression because, rather
than penalizing expression after the fact, it prevented the expression
from occurring in the first place. While such prior restraints are not
unconstitutional per se, there is a strong presumption that they are not
constitutionally valid.47
Because special, or conditional, permits, raise the same prior re-
straint issues as licensing ordinances, courts have applied the FW/PBS
standards in those instances as well. Recent decisions applying the FW/
PBS ruling have struck down ordinances that lacked effective time
43. 470 S.E.2d 879 (Ga. 1996).
44. See also Chambers v. Peach County, 467 S.E.2d 819 (Ga. 1996) (holding
that county ordinance violated First Amendment because it had not relied on evidence
reasonably related to problem of undesirable secondary effects of adult nightclub featur-
ing nude dancing).
45. 670 N.E.2d 162 (Mass. 1996).
46. 493 U.S. 215 (1990).
47. The six Justices in the majority split evenly, however, on what procedural
safeguards were required to validate an adult business licensing ordinance. While all
agreed that such ordinances must not "place unbridled discretion in the hands of a
government official or agency"; must require a definite time limit within which the
decision-maker must issue or deny the license, during which time the status quo must
be maintained; and must allow for prompt judicial review if the license is erroneously
denied, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, argued that, in
addition, a licensing ordinance must require that the government bear both the burden
of going to court to enforce the denial of a license application and the burden of proof
in court. Justice O'Connor wrote an opinion arguing for the lesser standard, which
was joined by Justices Kennedy and Stevens. The procedural safeguards about which
the Justices disagreed were first stated in Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
limitations, 48 failed to limit the discretion of city officials, 49 required
adult businesses operating at the time an ordinance was enacted to cease
operations until they obtained a license or permit,5 ° or charged higher
fees for adult businesses, because this regulated on the basis of the
content of expression.5' Likewise, in JJR, Inc. v. City of Seattle,52
the Washington Supreme Court, without citing FW/PBS, held that a
licensing scheme that allowed the city to revoke or suspend a license
to operate an adult business without a mandatory stay of revocation
or suspension pending judicial review was an invalid prior restraint
under the state constitution. But where a licensing or special permit
scheme provides adequate procedural safeguards, it will be upheld. 3
C. Regulating Nude Dancing Through Public
Indecency Laws
In Barnes v. Glen Theatres, Inc. ,54 a divided Supreme Court upheld
the application of Indiana's public indecency statute to prohibit totally
nude dancing in bars and cabarets. Courts have routinely upheld ordi-
nances prohibiting nude dancing in adult entertainment establishments,
based on a showing that the ordinance was aimed at avoiding undesirable
secondary effects.5 5 Courts will also invoke the Twenty-First Amend-
ment to uphold local ordinances that prohibit nude dancing in bars or
deny a liquor license to any establishment that features totally nude
56 irmoecdancing, or require more clothing to be worn by erotic dancers in an
48. See, e.g., Annapolis Road, Ltd. V. Anne Arundel County, 686 A.2d 727
(Md. Ct. App. 1996); 11126 Baltimore Boulevard, Inc. v. Prince George's County,
32 F.3d. 109 (4th Cir. 1994); Redner v. Dean, 29 F.3d 1495 (1lth Cir. 1994); MGA
SUSU, Inc. v. County of Benton, 853 F. Supp. 1147 (D. Minn. 1994).
49. See, e.g., 3570 East Foothill Blvd., Inc. v. City of Pasadena, 912 F. Supp.
1268 (C.D. Cal. 1996); East Brooks Books, Inc. v. City of Memphis, 48 F.3d 220
(6th Cir. 1995).
50. See T.K.'s Video, Inc. v. Denton County, 24 F.3d 705 (5th Cir. 1994); Grand
Brittain, Inc. v. City of Amarillo, Texas, 27 F.3d 1068 (5th Cir. 1994).
51. See AAK, Inc. v. City of Woonsocket, 830 F. Supp. 99 (D.R.I. 1993).
52. 126 Wash. 2d 1, 891 P.2d 720 (1995).
53. See, e.g., Specialty Malls of Tampa v. City of Tampa, 916 F. Supp. 1222
(M.D. Fla. 1996); City of Colorado Springs v. 2354 Inc., 1995 WL 262721 (Colo.).
54. 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
55. See, e.g., Dodger's Bar & Grill v. Johnson County Bd. of Comm'rs, 815 F.
Supp. 399 (D. Kan. 1993), remanded on other grounds, 32 F.3d 1436 (10th Cir.
1994); decision on remand, 889 F. Supp. 1431 (D. Kan. 1995), aff'd, 98 F.3d 1262
(10th Cir. 1996); Cafe 207, Inc. v. St. Johns County, 856 F. Supp. 641 (M.D. Fla.
1994); Bright Lights, Inc. v. City of Newport, 830 F. Supp. 378 (E.D. Ky. 1993);
O'Malley v. City of Syracuse, 813 F. Supp. 133 (N.D.N.Y. 1993); Gravely v. Bacon,
263 Ga. 203, 429 S.E.2d 663 (1993); S.J.T., Inc. v. Richmond County, 263 Ga. 267,
430 S.E.2d 726 (1993).
56. See Proctor v. County of Penobscot, 651 A.2d 355 (Me. 1994); Knudtson v.
City of Coates, 519 N.W.2d 166 (Minn. 1994).
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establishment serving alcohol than by citizens on the streets or
beaches."
By contrast, courts have struck down ordinances that extended the
nude dancing ban to "mainstream" establishments,58 or, conversely,
upheld exceptions to the ban that are limited to "mainstream" establish-
ments, 59 because there is no evidence that nude dancing in such estab-
lishments produces undesirable secondary effects. Courts have also not
hesitated to strike down ordinances targeting nude dancing when an
intent to suppress protected expression, rather than the stated concerns
about secondary effects, was the motivation for the ordinance, 60 or the
ordinance was unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. 6
Although the opinions by Justices Rehnquist and Scalia in Barnes
gave a green light to state and local governments to bar nude dancing
on public morality grounds, the fact that Justice Souter, who provided
the crucial fifth vote to uphold the statute, based his concurring opinion
on a secondary effects justification for the statute has strongly influenced
subsequent court decisions.
Courts have, however, differed in their consideration of the" second-
ary effects" issue. In Triplett Grille, Inc. v. City of Akron, 62 for exam-
ple, the Sixth Circuit struck down an ordinance banning all nudity in
public places because the city had produced no evidence that the ordi-
nance was required to address negative secondary effects of non-adult-
entertainment, as was required by Justice Souter's concurrence in
Barnes. But in Pap's A.M. v. City of Erie 63 a Pennsylvania appellate
court upheld a public nudity ordinance under a "secondary effects"
rationale, distinguishing Triplett Grille because the state court found
that it could adequately narrow the construction of the ordinance to
avoid constitutional conflicts, whereas the Sixth Circuit was unable to
supply a narrowing interpretation because federal courts will not rewrite
statutes to create constitutionality.
An extremely critical view of the Souter approach can be seen in
Nakatomi Investments, Inc. v. City of Schenectady,64 where the court
stated that "[a]pplying the lax standard articulated by Justice Souter
57. See Dodger's Bar & Grill, 815 F. Supp. at 399.
58. See, e.g., Pel Aso, Inc. v. Joseph, 262 Ga. 904, 427 S.E.2d 264 (1993).
59. See, e.g., Top Shelf, Inc. v. Mayor and Aldermen for City of Savannah, 840
F. Supp. 903 (S.D. Ga. 1993); S.J.T., Inc., 430 S.E.2d at 726.
60. See Conner v. Town of Hilton Head Island, 442 S.E.2d 608 (S.C. 1994).
61. Id. See also Triplett Grille, Inc. v. City of Akron, 40 F.3d 129 (6th Cir.
1994); Pel Asso, 427 S.E.2d at 264.
62. 40 F.3d 129 (6th Cir. 1994).
63. 674 A.2d 338 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996).
64. 949 F. Supp.988 (N.D.N.Y. 1997).
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to its logical conclusion, one naturally comes to the point where the
government can ban all forms of erotic dancing, nude or otherwise,
so long as there are pernicious side effects somehow associated with
the performance.' ,
65
Thus, the analysis of the "secondary effects" issue can be critical
to a court's view of an ordinance that "targets" nude/topless dancing
outside of "mainstream" venues. Such "targeting" can either be seen
as valid under a "secondary effects" analysis, or as impermissible
censorship if the court rejects Justice Souter's analysis and relies on the
public morality rationale stated by the Barnes plurality. See Nakatomi,
supra, unless the court applies a narrowing construction as in Pap 's,
supra.
Regulation of dancers' contact with patrons has been an emerging
issue, with courts upholding ordinances that impose "time, place and
manner" restrictions on erotic dancing, such as barring physical contact
with patrons or prescribing minimum distances between dancers and
patrons. 66
65. Id. at 8. See, e.g., Bright Lights, Inc. v. City of Newport, 830 F. Supp. 378
(E.D. Ky. 1993), upholding ordinance requiring dancers to wear bathing suits.
66. See, e.g., Colacurcio v. City of Kent, 944 F. Supp. 1470 (W.D. Wash. 1996),
upholding 10-foot distance requirement, and rejecting claim that "table dancing" is
unique form of expression protected by the U.S. Constitution; DLS, Inc. v. City of
Chattanooga, 894 F. Supp. 1140 (E.D. Tenn. 1995), and Vanda Hodge Pub, Inc. v.
New York St. Liq. Auth., 634 N.Y.S.2d 152 (A.D. 2d Dep't 1995) (both upholding
6-foot requirement); Club Southern Burlesque, Inc. v. City of Carrollton, 265 Ga.
528, 457 S.E.2d 816 (1995) (upholding 4-foot requirement).
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